The Automatic Termination of Precautionary Measures: On the Need for a Balanced Approach

I read in the press about a “disaster,” a “bizarre rationale” that “reinvents the law” – nothing more than 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐚𝐫𝐞𝐚 𝐢̂𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐭𝐚̆𝐫𝐢𝐢 𝐝𝐞 𝐝𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐭 𝐚 𝐮𝐧𝐨𝐫 𝐦𝐚̆𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐢 𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐠𝐮𝐫𝐚̆𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐢 𝐝𝐞 𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐯𝐚𝐥𝐨𝐚𝐫𝐞 (something that has been happening constantly in judicial practice since late 2021).

I will try to summarize as clearly as possible the two issues raised by recent media discussions, if only because these are issues I have been dealing with for over 13 years and about which I have written extensively throughout this period. I am trying to write dispassionately and as objectively as possible, and I hope to contribute in this way to a proper understanding of the issue (𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐞𝐳 𝐜𝐚̆ 𝐦𝐚̆ 𝐫𝐞𝐟𝐞𝐫 𝐥𝐚 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐛𝐥𝐞𝐦𝐞 𝐝𝐞 𝐝𝐫𝐞𝐩𝐭, having no access to the reasoning behind the decision beyond what appeared in the press).

Context: Since February 2021, the Code of Criminal Procedure has been amended with a particularly problematic provision, Article 250(2), which states that “In all preliminary proceedings, the𝑛𝑎𝑙, 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑢𝑙, 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑎̆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑢𝑙 𝑑𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑎̆ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑎̆ 𝑠𝑎𝑢, 𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑎̆ 𝑐𝑎𝑧, to establish the𝑖𝑐𝑎̆ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑐, since we’ve been here for 6 months the entire urban area, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣 𝑢𝑛 𝑎𝑛 𝑖̂𝑛 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑢𝑙 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑎̆𝑡̧𝑖𝑖, 𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑎̆ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑧𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎̆ 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑢 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑠𝑎𝑢 𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡̧𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑚𝑎̆𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎̆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑖, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑎̂𝑛𝑑, 𝑑𝑢𝑝𝑎̆ 𝑐𝑎𝑧, 𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡̧𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎, restore your experience𝑒𝑎 𝑚𝑎̆𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑒, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣 𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑚𝑎̆𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑢𝑠𝑒, 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑡. 250 𝑠̧𝑖 250 𝑖𝑛𝑑. 1 𝑎𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎̂𝑛𝑑𝑢-𝑠𝑒 𝑖̂𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑢𝑛𝑧𝑎̆𝑡𝑜𝑟.”

In short, the text states that when a criminal case involves precautionary measures (seizures and attachments), the prosecutor must review every six months whether they are still necessary (while the case is in the pretrial investigation phase), and the judge (once the case has been referred to him or her) must do so annually. The prosecutor’s decision may be challenged by filing an appeal with the judge; the judge’s decision may be challenged in the same manner, before other judges.

The first issue: the nature of the 6-month or 1-year deadline—is it a substantive or procedural deadline? And if it is procedural, is it mandatory or merely advisory? (No one has suggested that it is merely a delay.)

𝐓𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐧 𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭̦𝐢𝐚𝐥 = applies to measures that restrict or deprive individuals of their rights; it therefore relates to substantive rights protected by law (e.g., the right to liberty, the right to property)

𝐓𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐧 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐞𝐝𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐥 = the period within which or by which certain acts, activities, or procedural measures (e.g., the deadline for filing an appeal), and is therefore related to procedural rights

𝑻𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒍 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒅𝒆 𝒓𝒆𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒅𝒂𝒓𝒆 is one that does not entail consequences (penalties) in the event of non-compliance.

𝑻𝒆𝒓𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒍 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒅𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒍 𝒊𝒎𝒑𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗 is the one whose violation results in penalties.

That, in simple terms, is the theory; much has been written in legal scholarship about time limits and their classification for a long time now—not just recently.

“The ‘reinvention of the law,’ which ‘shocked legal experts,’ stems from the fact that, in the case being discussed in the media, the court reportedly ruled that a particular term is substantive, citing ‘isolated scholarly opinions.’”

The reality: 𝐜𝐚𝐦 𝐭𝐨𝐚𝐭𝐚̆ 𝐝𝐨𝐜𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐚 𝐬𝐩𝐮𝐧𝐞 𝐜𝐚̆ 𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐮𝐥 𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐞 𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭̦𝐢𝐚𝐥 (some sources are also cited in the ruling), as it is established to protect property rights. I am quoting here what I have on hand from my vacation and what friends quickly provided me with—thank you (𝑠̦𝑖 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡̦𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑐 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑢 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎the one who has the ability𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠̦𝑖 𝑎𝑢 𝑎𝑗𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑎 𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑙𝑢𝑖)!

V. R. Gherghe, Review of Precautionary Measures During Criminal Proceedings, in Dreptul No. 1/2022

L. Criste, “Review of Precautionary Measures in Criminal Proceedings,” in Criminal Law Journal No. 1/2022, p. 11

Gh. Mateuț, Criminal Procedure. General Part, 2nd edition, Universul Juridic Publishing House, 2025 (𝑖̂𝑛 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑑𝑒 𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡̦𝑖𝑒 – 𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑡̦𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑐 𝑓𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒 𝑙𝑎 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑗 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑢𝑖 𝑙𝑎 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎̆ 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒 𝑖̂𝑛𝑐𝑎̆ 𝑛𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑎̆)

A. Iugan, Criminal Procedure: General Part, 2nd ed., CH Beck, Bucharest, 2024, p. 675

M. Udroiu, Overview of Criminal Procedure: General Part. 6th ed., CH Beck, Bucharest, 2025, pp. 164–164

D. Lupașcu, Precautionary Measures in Criminal Proceedings (III). Duration. Lifting of the Measure. Expiry by Operation of Law, published on www.juridice.ro in 2024

And I wrote the same thing in the annotated Criminal Procedure Code (the last two editions), specifically revisiting the opinion I had expressed a little over two months after the law introducing Article 250(2) into the Criminal Procedure Code came into effect.

Given that the term is of a mixed nature (both substantive and procedural, as it protects two types of interests), he elaborated Gherghe Vicentiu-Razvan later in 𝑀𝑎̆𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎̆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑖̂𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙, Ed. Hamangiu, Bucharest, 2025, p. 798 (and earlier to reach this conclusion).

Without explicitly stating that the term is substantive, but linking the text to Article 53(2) of the Constitution and the right to property (and acknowledging the termination by operation of law), see also B. Micu, R. Slăvoiu, A. Zarafiu, Criminal Procedure, 3rd ed., Hamangiu Publishing, Bucharest, 2025, p. 414.

For those who are not specialists and are unfamiliar with the terms above, to summarize: 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐞𝐬𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐢 𝐝𝐞 𝐥𝐚 𝐁𝐮𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐬̦𝐭𝐢 (𝐦𝐚𝐢 𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐞 𝐟𝐚𝐜𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐚̆𝐭̦𝐢) 𝐬̦𝐢 𝐂𝐥𝐮𝐣, 𝐚𝐯𝐨𝐜𝐚𝐭̦𝐢, 𝐣𝐮𝐝𝐞𝐜𝐚̆𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢, 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐨𝐫𝐢 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫𝐚̆ 𝐭𝐨𝐭̦𝐢 𝐜𝐚̆ 𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐮𝐥 𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐞 𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭̦𝐢𝐚𝐥, 𝐜𝐮𝐦 𝐫𝐞𝐳𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐚̆ 𝐜𝐚̆ 𝐚 𝐬𝐩𝐮𝐬 𝐬̦𝐢 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭̦𝐚, 𝐜𝐢𝐭𝐚̂𝐧𝐝 𝐨 𝐩𝐚𝐫𝐭𝐞 𝐝𝐢𝐧 𝐚𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐞 𝐥𝐮𝐜𝐫𝐚̆𝐫𝐢.

Why is this relevant?

Because the substantive deadline per month is calculated one way, and the procedural deadline another.

If it's substantial, there are two options we've identified.

One approach would be to calculate it in accordance with Article 186(1) of the Criminal Code (which would apply pursuant to Article 602 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), that is, without taking into account the day on which the sentence is served.

According to another view, such a substantial period is calculated in accordance with Article 271 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which applies to periods measured in months as follows: both the day on which the period begins and the day on which it ends are included in the calculation. A month beginning on March 1 ends on March 31. A month beginning on March 1 ends on April 14. Six months beginning on March 15 end on September 14 (always one day before the respective date, in the corresponding month).

As I wrote in the annotated CPP:

“𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟, 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢 𝑚𝑎̆𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎̆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑢 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜on February 28, 2021 (date of entry into force 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑖), the term "calculate" is used𝑎 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑙 𝑙𝑎 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎 𝑎𝑢 𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒. 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛 𝑢𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑒, 𝑜 𝑚𝑎̆𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎̆ 𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎̆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒 𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡on March 15, 2021, in thethe final round of the competition𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑎̆ 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑒on Thursday, September 14, 2021 (𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑙𝑢𝑖 – 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑎𝑢 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡̦𝑖𝑎𝑙 – 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑎 𝑓𝑖 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑎̆; 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑟 𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑟𝑎̆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖̂𝑛𝑡𝑟-𝑢𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑠̦𝑖 𝑑𝑒𝑠̦𝑖 𝑛𝑢 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎̆ 𝑖̂𝑛𝑐𝑎̆ 𝑜 𝑠𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡̦𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎̆𝑧𝑢𝑡𝑎̆ 𝑑𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑢 𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑎 𝑑𝑒 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑚𝑎̆𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎 𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑟𝑎̆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒, 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑚 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑢𝑠̦𝑖 𝑐𝑎̆ 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑙 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑢𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡̦𝑖𝑎𝑙, the textile industry𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑎̆ 𝑐𝑢 𝑐𝑒𝑎 𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎̆ 𝑖̂𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑧𝑢𝑙 𝑚𝑎̆𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒, 𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑒 𝑎 𝑖̂𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎 𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑝𝑒 𝑜 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑎̆ 𝑖̂𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑎̆ 𝑎 𝑢𝑛𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑒 – 𝑖̂𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎 𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑢𝑙𝑢𝑖 𝑑𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒; 𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑎 𝑖̂𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑛𝑎̆ 𝑠̦𝑖 𝑐𝑎̆ 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑙 𝑛𝑢 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑢𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑎̆𝑟𝑖𝑖 (…)”.

So no matter what text we apply, the result is the same.

In contrast, the procedural deadline for Mondays is calculated differently, in accordance with Article 269(3) C.pr. procedural, meaning it expires at the end of the corresponding day of the last month. Thus, in the example above, a procedural deadline that began on March 15, 2021, expired on September 15, 2021 (the last day on which the measure was to be reviewed).

The second issue (also related to the importance of the qualification mentioned above): 𝐜𝐞 𝐬𝐞 𝐢̂𝐧𝐭𝐚̂𝐦𝐩𝐥𝐚̆ 𝐝𝐚𝐜𝐚̆ 𝐦𝐚̆𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐚 𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐠𝐮𝐫𝐚̆𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐞 𝐧𝐮 𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐞 𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐚̆ 𝐢̂𝐧 𝐜𝐞𝐥𝐞 𝟔 𝐥𝐮𝐧𝐢, did you notice anything?

Doctrine: 𝐜𝐮 𝐞𝐱𝐜𝐞𝐩𝐭̦𝐢𝐚 𝐦𝐞𝐚 , 𝐭𝐨𝐚𝐭𝐚̆ 𝐥𝐮𝐦𝐞𝐚 𝐬𝐩𝐮𝐧𝐞 𝐜𝐚̆ 𝐝𝐞𝐩𝐚̆𝐬̦𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐚 𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐮𝐥𝐮𝐢 𝐝𝐞 𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐟𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐫𝐞 𝐚 𝐦𝐚̆𝐬𝐮𝐫𝐢𝐢 𝐚𝐬𝐢𝐠𝐮𝐫𝐚̆𝐭𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐢 𝐚the grounds for the decision. I will not repeat the reasons; in short, Article 268(2) of the Criminal Code is invoked, as well as a decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice (HCCJ) issued in an appeal in the interest of the law (RIL 7/2006) regarding the review of preventive measures, the situation being identical to that existing in this matter (preventive measures are not imposed for a fixed term, but are reviewed periodically).

Why don’t I believe it ceases to exist by operation of law? For the sole reason that we have no “law”—that is, no statutory text (including a ruling by the High Court of Cassation and Justice in a binding decision, specifically the RIL, because the HP was attempted and dismissed as inadmissible in accordance with relatively consistent case law on procedural matters). As I said, my opinion is in the minority (probably unique, unless I’ve missed something).

What the case law says:

– with the exception of a 2022 ruling, handed down by a majority vote (2-1), 𝐩𝐚̂𝐧𝐚̆ 𝐝𝐞 𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐚̂𝐧𝐝 𝐩𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚 𝐈̂𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐭𝐞𝐢 𝐂𝐮𝐫𝐭̦𝐢 𝐞𝐫𝐚 𝐮𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐢𝐦𝐚̆ 𝐢̂𝐧 𝐚 𝐚𝐟𝐢𝐫𝐦𝐚 𝐜𝐚̆ 𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐮𝐥 𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐞 𝐮𝐧𝐮𝐥 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐞𝐝𝐮𝐫𝐚𝐥 𝐝𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐧𝐝𝐚𝐫𝐞 (I have cited many decisions in the annotated CPP; I will not repeat them here), and therefore exceeding it does not lead to automatic termination. Recently, at the ICCJ level, a separate opinion characterized the deadline as substantial; I have heard (but have not read it—it was not reasoned when I checked) that in another decision, the measures would have been automatically terminated;

– 𝐩𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚 𝐜𝐞𝐥𝐨𝐫𝐥𝐚𝐥𝐭𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭̦𝐞, 𝐦𝐚𝐢 𝐜𝐮 𝐬𝐞𝐚𝐦𝐚̆ 𝐚 𝐜𝐮𝐫𝐭̦𝐢𝐥𝐨𝐫 𝐝𝐞 𝐚𝐩𝐞𝐥, 𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐞 𝐢̂𝐦𝐩𝐚̆𝐫𝐭̦𝐢𝐭𝐚̆. At the Bucharest Court of Appeal, I’m more familiar with it, and it’s probably somewhere around 50-50% (the practice tends to focus on termination by operation of law rather than the nature of the term, but the two are linked). And it’s been this way for 4 years since the legal issue arose. A simple search on Rejust yields hundreds of rulings in line with this recent one, but also many others to the contrary. That the amounts are large, that the damage is significant, that the victims are numerous—yes, but that is why some people take on the responsibility to decide, and I believe we should be fairer to them.

To preempt a question: is it normal for there to be such a difference of opinion? Unfortunately, this happens in many areas; indeed, action should already have been taken here through various mechanisms.

In my opinion, the legislature should have corrected the text promptly (it has already been four and a half years since we all pointed out the problem), the Constitutional Court could have ruled on the hundreds of exceptions raised in this regard (and then the legislature could have acted quickly, because I believe the Constitutional Court’s decision alone would not have the effect of immediately resolving the issue), and a RIL could have already been issued, as this is a clear example of inconsistent practice. In fact, both my colleagues who hold the opposite view and I, after so many different solutions, have kept saying that “𝐬𝐚̆ 𝐟𝐢𝐞 𝐨𝐫𝐢𝐜𝐮𝐦, 𝐝𝐚𝐫 𝐬𝐚̆ 𝐬̦𝐭𝐢𝐦 𝐬𝐢𝐠𝐮𝐫 𝐜𝐮𝐦 𝐞.”

I regret that the media presents only one side of the opinions and issues that actually exist in this matter. I believe a balanced approach and a presentation of both sides would be welcome (a “on the one hand,” “on the other hand” approach would be very helpful).

I think what I meant to say was that we shouldn't jump to conclusions without getting the facts. And, in general, we shouldn't jump to conclusions.